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Abstract 
This paper examines the principal contributions to debates surrounding European 
integration which have appeared in the Netherlands since the country’s rejection of the 
European Constitutional Treaty in June 2005.  Party progammatic statements, the results 
of public consultation exercises, the principal governmental advisory reports, and the 
policy statements of the recently formed Balkenende IV government are all surveyed.  A 
picture emerges of a clearly defined national discourse on Europe, informed by what is 
presently termed a ‘limits of Europe’ approach.  Strongly emphasising the principle of 
subsidiarity, this approach is primarily concerned with delimiting both the substantive 
and the geographical reach of the European Union, though recognising that selective 
expansion may be desirable.   This distinctive, national framing of European issues is 
then further placed in comparative perspective, suggesting the particular difficulties 
which may have to be faced by Dutch political elites as they embark upon a new round of 
treaty reform negotiations. 
 
Introduction 
  The decisive ‘No’ delivered by Dutch voters to the European Constitutional 
Treaty on 1 June 2005 may be ascribed to a complex amalgam of factors.  Certainly, the 
mishandling of the campaign by the principal governmental and opposition parties 
aligned on the ‘Yes’ side played an important role.  So too may the referendum result be 
read as at least partially a sign of a deeper political malaise, variously reflecting both a 
narrow rejection of the government of the day and a wider vote of non-confidence in 
national elites.  Nevertheless, it is clear from exit polling that attitudes towards ‘Europe’, 
if less perhaps judgments about the Constitutional Treaty itself, played a central role in 
structuring the outcome of the vote.
1  Both tangible grievances such as the size of the net 
Dutch budget contribution and less tangible anxieties concerned with a loss national 
identity emerge as having motivated Dutch ‘No’ voters.  Although in no sense a rejection 
of European integration, the Dutch vote may thus be seen as expressing an underlying 
‘Euroscepticism’, to the extent that it drew on an ambient climate of criticism which had 
come to surround the European Union in Dutch political debate.  Indeed, the success of 
the ‘No’ campaign in the Netherlands may significantly be read in terms of the relatively 
skilful exploitation of this climate by the Treaty’s opponents, who were able to make use 
of a wider arsenal of mainstream criticisms of the EU in mounting their more specific 
attack on the text (cf. Rood 2005). 
 
                                                 
1 See Aarts and van der Kolk (2005, 2006) and Harmsen (2005) for overviews of the referendum.   The ‘critical turn’ in Dutch European debate preceding the referendum may in 
part be understood in terms of the re-emergence of a traditional discourse of ‘national 
interest’ – and, still more, a sense that the Netherlands was being uniquely disadvantaged 
in the realisation of this interest within the European arena.
2  This renewed discourse of 
national interest may be traced back to the early 1990s.  At the time, Liberal (VVD) 
leader Frits Bolkestein controversially argued that the country must not be hamstrung by 
its elite’s internationalist instincts, and must more resolutely ‘fight its corner’ in 
European negotiations.  Bolkestein’s position found further support in the public stances 
of his party colleague, long-serving Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm.  Notably, it was Zalm 
who made something of a cause célèbre of the size of the Dutch budget contribution, as 
well as adopting a sharply critical public stance concerning what he regarded as the laxity 
with which the Eurozone budget deficit requirements were applied in the cases of 
Germany and France.  All of this found rather evocative expression in the popular image 
of the country as the ‘Gekke Henkie’ of the EU – in effect, the ‘dupe’ whose gullibility or 
good intentions were being systematically exploited by its more guileful or powerful 
partners (cf. Petter and Griffiths 2005). 
 
  At the same time as this renewed discourse of national interest was gaining 
ground, a growing perception of a ‘misfit’ between the Dutch political system and its EU 
counterpart was also taking hold.  The Netherlands had long had a very comfortable 
position within the EU.  It had very much, to use a more general epithet, experienced 
European integration as a ‘warm bath’ rather than a ‘cold shower’.  Historically, there 
had appeared to be a natural ‘goodness of fit’ between the Dutch political model and its 
emerging EU counterpart, both based on predominately inclusive, consensual styles of 
policy-making.  Similarly, the broad development of the European integration project 
appeared to correspond almost ‘naturally’ to Dutch foreign policy goals, providing a 
highly institutionalised, multilateral framework within which to manage its key political 
and commercial relationships.  It was, indeed, against this background that the perception 
took hold, both in the country and abroad, of the Netherlands as a staunch supporter of a 
European ‘federalist’ project – although this was always something of a thinly rooted 
‘faux fédéralisme’ (cf. Koch 2001). 
  
  This cosy consensus, which tended to accept ‘more Europe’ relatively 
unquestioningly as a ‘Good Thing’, has progressively eroded since the early 1990s.  It 
has been replaced by what might be termed a ‘limits of Europe’ discursive framework.
3  
Essentially, as suggested by this label, the centre of gravity of Dutch political discourse is 
now one which continues to provide broad support for national participation in the 
project of European integration, but which has principally come to be concerned with 
defining the substantive and geographical limits of that project.  Substantively, a range of 
concerns have grown and found expression across the political spectrum as to the manner 
                                                 
2 See Harmsen (2004) and Vollaard and Boer (2005, 2006) for overviews of the longer term rise of Dutch 
Euroscepticism. 
3 I have borrowed the term ‘limits of Europe’ from the title of a 2004 book by Frits Bolkestein published in 
both Dutch and English (Bolkestein 2004a; 2004b).  The book itself, essentially a collection of interviews 
with MEPs who had previously prominent national political careers, has not been particularly influential – 
but does, in its introduction, set out a vision of the dual substantive and geographical limits of the European 
Union which is illustrative of the wider discursive frame presently examined. in which ‘Europe’ may be unduly interfering with distinctive national policy choices.  At 
the same time, the continued geographical enlargement of the Union has also become a 
subject of political discussion – both as regards objections to particular enlargements and 
with respect to the more general implications of this expansion for the Netherlands’ place 
as a comparatively small player in a much larger entity.   In many respects, this discursive 
evolution may be seen as reflecting both a normal ‘politicisation’ of European debate and 
as a consequent response to the country’s changed geopolitical situation.  Yet, it also has 
tended to entrench a (literally) negative image of European integration in domestic 
debate, with discussion of the European Union essentially coming to be focused on the 
necessity of its limitation.  The consequences of this discursive framing have been nicely 
captured by (then) Labour Party chair Ruud Koole (2005), who spoke of a ‘European 
monster’ as having inadvertently arisen in Dutch pro-European discourse – with the 
Constitutional Treaty having correspondingly come to be portrayed not as a positive 
institutional project, but rather primarily as a means to tame the beast. 
 
  Against this background, the challenge of the post-referendum period for the 
Dutch political elite could consequently be seen as that of reframing a national narrative 
of European integration.  In part, this challenge may be conceived as one of institutional 
reform and renewal, providing more effective channels of representation as regards 
European issues in the national political process.  In part, the challenge is also that of 
representation in a wider discursive or cultural sense, demanding the provision of a more 
positively articulated vision of the nation’s place and purpose within the European Union. 
 
  The question thus remains as to whether, in the two years now passed since the 
2005 referendum, these challenges have been met.  The present paper, to that end, 
provides a detailed survey of the evolution of Dutch party positions on European 
integration in the intervening period, of the successes and failures of wider processes of 
public consultation, of the contributions of the specialist policy community, and finally of 
the European policy of the newly installed Balkenende IV government.  The portrait 
which emerges is, as will be seen, essentially one in which the broad contours of Dutch 
European debate have not shifted.  The ‘limits of Europe’ discursive paradigm outlined 
above continues to define the parameters of discussion, albeit in a progressively more 
consolidated and elaborated form.  The implications of this discursive continuity are 
finally discussed in the conclusion, which also places the Dutch case in comparative 
perspective.  
 
Political Parties 
  Consistent with previous Dutch elections and experience elsewhere, European 
issues did not figure with any prominence in the campaign for the November 2006 
national parliamentary election.  Indeed, the virtual absence of such discussion drew 
criticism both from academic commentators (van Grinsven et al. 2006; de Volkskrant, 10 
November 2006) and from the government’s own Advisory Council on International 
Affairs (AIV 2006).   
 
Yet, though there has not been a competitive politicisation of European issues, 
those issues did not completely disappear off the radar screens of the main Dutch political parties.  Most notably, all five of the principal parties which had campaigned on the 
losing ‘Yes’ side in the referendum issued some form of report or note reviewing their 
European policy in the year after the vote.  That all five should have engaged in an 
exercise of this type is a telling indication of the extent of the shock which the vote 
represented to much of the Dutch political establishment.  Yet, the limits of these 
exercises also rapidly become apparent.  In no case did the reviews produce a major shift 
in party policy.  Rather, these documents for the most part served to confirm existing 
party positions on European integration, at best providing for a somewhat more detailed 
articulation of specific policy choices.  The broad contours of party-based European 
debate in the Netherlands have thus remained essentially unchanged, defined both before 
and after the referendum principally with reference to an overarching ‘limits of Europe’ 
discourse. 
 
  Strikingly, given the ‘faux fédéraliste’ consensus which had once marked the 
Dutch debate, it is now only the small (and declining) left-liberal Democrats ’66 who 
espouse an explicitly federal vision of European integration.  The party, indeed, presents 
itself as maintaining this ‘pro-European’ position in a situation where ‘the wind is 
blowing the other way and many parties are choosing on the basis of opinion polls to opt 
for a more cautious position as regards Europe’ (Democraten ’66 2005: 3).  The detailed 
document published by the party’s parliamentary party in December 2005 resolutely nails 
its colours to the mast, calling for the abolition of all national vetoes and progressive 
moves towards the establishment of a ‘United States of Europe’.  M u c h  t h e  s a m e  
message is also found in the party’s 2006 electoral manifesto, which again reaffirms its 
commitment to a ‘federal Europe’ (Democraten ’66 2006: 63-64), while also making the 
case for clearer, unencumbered grants of power to the European level, including the 
formation of a European army. 
 
  The ‘Euro-enthusiasm’ of the Democrats ’66 finds a more limited echo in the 
position of the other comparatively small party which had formed part of the 2005 ‘Yes’ 
camp – GreenLeft.  Although still accurately classifiable as a ‘soft Eurosceptic’ party in 
the late 1990s, the party has in recent years moved in a resolutely, though not electorally 
unproblematic ‘pro-European’ direction.  GreenLeft has maintained its earlier criticisms 
of both the democratic shortcomings of European institutions and the environmental 
failings of EU policies, but has broadly come to see the remedy for these problems to lie 
in the further development of European integration.  It is this earlier shift in policy which 
finds continued expression in the May 2006 position document, ‘Freely European’, 
jointly produced by the party’s national and European parliamentary groups (GroenLinks 
2006).  The document, reflecting the more general national climate of opinion, calls for 
‘less Europe’ in some areas, including the removal of any threat of European-level 
‘interference’ (bemoeinis) in such sensitive areas of national policy as abortion, 
euthanasia, and soft drugs.  It also, more generally, proposes the adoption of a ‘Charter of 
National Competences’, intended to allay fears of a creeping infringement by ‘Brussels’ 
on national life. At the same time, however, there is an advocacy of ‘more Europe’ in a 
relatively wide range of policy areas, most prominently extending to those concerned 
with transborder environmental and social problems.  The GreenLeft policy document 
also, alone amongst the recent position statements of the principal Dutch parties, displays an appetite for a further round of constitutional debate – supporting the establishment of a 
new Convention, which would include a proportion of directly elected members and 
whose handiwork would be subject to subsequent ratification by a Europe-wide 
referendum. 
 
  A comparable ‘check listing’ approach, identifying areas in which either ‘more’ 
or ‘less’ ‘Europe’ is deemed desirable, was adopted in the discussion documents 
produced by the three large parties which had formed the core of the 2005 ‘Yes’ camp.  
These documents, though of varying length and detail, display a striking similarity of 
both content and tone.  The position papers produced by the Christian Democrats (CDA), 
the Labour Party (PvdA), and the Liberals (VVD) are all careful to stress the manifold 
historical and contemporary benefits of European integration for the Netherlands, 
sounding variations on a well-established, if decreasingly resonant discourse linking the 
integration project to post-war ‘peace and prosperity’.  From this basis, all three party 
documents also identify areas in which the further development of European co-operation 
appears either desirable or necessary – and, in so doing, all specify much the same range 
of current, high-profile issue areas (encompassing sustainable development, immigration 
and asylum policy, cross-border crime, and terrorism).  The three parties further 
uniformly show themselves to be supporters of the continued development of European 
foreign policy co-operation.  Yet, though recognising the benefits of past and (selected) 
future European co-operation, all three documents conversely also stress the need for 
clearer limits to be placed on the European integration project, viewing subsidiarity and 
proportionality (though not always by name) as the guiding principles for the future 
development of the Union.  The specific areas of concern highlighted by the individual 
parties in this vein do, nonetheless, predictably somewhat differ in light of their differing 
ideological positions and electoral constituencies.  Finally, all three party documents 
devote significant attention to the question of the geographical limits of the EU, with the 
need for a strict(er) adherence to the Copenhagen criteria in relation to future 
enlargement(s) emerging as a shared concern.  The CDA, however, shows a particular 
concern with firmly - and restrictively - fixing the ultimate boundaries of the Union. 
 
  Amongst the bigger parties, the most extensive internal consultation process was 
undertaken by the Labour Party.  The party leadership was concerned that the referendum 
not be allowed to open a more enduring breach between itself and the party grassroots, 
insofar as all polling showed a clear majority of PvdA supporters to have opted for a ‘No’ 
vote.  That this was a driving motivation for the exercise can perhaps be no better 
illustrated than with reference to the title of the final working group report, ‘Europe: 
Winning Back Trust’ (PvdA 2005).  Substantively, the final report set out a 
comparatively detailed and cohesive blueprint for the future direction of policy, strongly 
anchored in a principle of subsidiarity (though never directly using the term).  This 
broadly may be seen to rest on two axes.  First, the document was concerned to limit the 
reach of internal market regulation.  In this vein, it argues that greater scope should be 
left for regional and local variations in areas without direct cross-border consequences, as 
well as for the maintenance and development of existing forms of public/private 
partnerships (particularly important, in the Dutch case, in areas such as public housing).    
Second, taking the opposite tack to that of some of its sister parties (most prominently, the French Socialist Party), the document argues forcefully against  the further 
development of a ‘social Europe’.  This rejection partly stems from a stated desire to 
maintain higher national standards, though the case is also more generally made that the 
existing differences of provision reflect deeply embedded national practices which could 
not beneficially be harmonised.  Rather, the document suggests a less intrusive approach, 
in which a possible ‘rat race to the bottom’ would be prevented by a requirement that 
member states be held accountable for the maintenance of their own self-declared 
standards (with additional reference to agreed EU minimum norms).  An underlying 
concern with the application of a strict subsidiarity rule is further manifest in the report’s 
relatively novel call for a greater self-discipline, arguing that the party should not 
opportunistically seek to realise policy goals at the European level, if blocked at the 
national level, when there is not an overriding case for European-level regulation. 
 
  The report, accepted as a ‘basis for discussion’ at the Labour Party’s December 
2005 congress, generated significant internal criticism – both from those wishing a return 
to a more strongly ‘pro-European’ line, and those who wished a  more ‘Euro-critical’ (if 
not ‘Eurosceptic’) turn.  The broad outlines of the report may, nonetheless, be seen to 
have a left an imprint on the European section of the party’s 2006 electoral manifesto.  
Here, amplifying the self-described ‘Euro-realism’ which had already marked the 2002 
programme, emphasis is evenly balance between stressing the benefits of the integration 
project and its necessary limits – with those limits again explicitly tied to the preservation 
of distinctive national models of welfare provision and public services (PvdA 2006).  
Beyond the manifesto itself, it is further noteworthy that party leader Wouter Bos 
continued to sound a relatively critical note as regards European integration.  As he 
described his position in a brief book issued during the election campaign: ‘Yes, I see 
Europe as unavoidable.  I’m not really a Europe fan.  Critical member, you might say.  
Not a Eurosceptic, for that I am too aware of Europe’s achievements’ (Bos 2006: 48-49) 
 
  Probably the most prominent post-referendum discussions in the Liberal Party 
have surrounded the VVD’s strategic choices.  In September 2005, MP and foreign 
affairs spokesman Hans van Baalen gave public voice to wider doubts when he openly 
lamented the party’s choice to have campaigned in favour the Constitutional Treaty (Het 
Parool, 29 September 2005). In effect, though the party leadership had remained united 
(if on occasion demonstrably unenthusiastic) in its support for the Treaty during the 
campaign itself, it had consistently adopted a markedly more critical tone throughout the 
negotiating phase – with party spokespeople having regularly hammered home the 
message that ‘no Treaty’ would ultimately be preferable to a ‘bad Treaty’ (citing, in this 
latter respect, a number of provisions ultimately included in the final text).  At the least, 
this sent a decidedly mixed message to its electorate – and, in this, reflected a longer-term 
dilemma whereby the party’s adoption of an increasingly critical discourse on European 
integration had repeatedly appeared divorced from practical consequences when key 
policy choices had to be made.  Such strategic questions apart, the party’s substantive 
policy line has not seriously been called into question.  Both of the principal candidates 
for the party leadership in 2006, though clearly representing distinct (‘populist’ and 
‘establishment’) wings of the party, explicitly situated themselves in terms of a continuity 
with the relatively critical stance on European integration first staked out by Frits Bolkestein (NRC Handelsblad, 9 May 2006).  Emphasis thus continued to be placed on a 
self-styled pragmatic approach to European co-operation, centred on the full realisation 
of the internal market and more generally defined with reference to a strict adherence to a 
principle of subsidiarity.  The party’s five-point European agenda adopted in June 2006 
(VVD 2006a), as well as the passage dealing with the European Union in its brief 
electoral programme (VVD 2006b), also followed much the same line.  In keeping with 
the general tenor of the national European debate, these documents expressed selective 
support for increased European co-operation in areas such as energy and foreign policy, 
while at the same time calling for the rolling back of ‘unnecessary’ European regulation 
and insisting that more effective national control should be exercised over European 
decision-making. 
 
  The Christian Democrats were somewhat less shaken by the referendum result 
than their Liberal and Labour counterparts.  Most polling data showed that self-declared 
CDA voters were, relatively, among the more supportive segments of the electorate as 
regards the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 vote.  The party is also somewhat less 
directly exposed to challenges from proximate ‘Eurosceptic’ parties, insofar as the 
growth potential of the smaller Christian parties remains restricted by traditional 
confessional and other boundaries.  The CDA, nonetheless, also felt obliged to undertake 
an internal review of its European policy, and did so in terms which joined with the more 
general national refrain.  Its March 2006 discussion note (CDA 2006a) reflected the 
prevailing concern to provide a clearer demarcation of the boundaries of the European 
integration project, ultimately striking much the same balance between demands for 
‘more’ and ‘less’ ‘Europe’ to those previously discussed.  As noted above, the CDA 
document, however, particularly stood out for its strong concern to fix the geographical 
boundaries of the Union.  In a section evocatively titled ‘Bringing Europe to Order’, the 
report set out a comparatively restrictive view as regards future enlargements.  Most 
notably, it argued that, for the foreseeable future, no further enlargements should be 
envisaged or promised to any country beyond the three candidate states already in the 
queue – and that the accession of those states should be subject to very tight controls on 
fulfillment of the relevant criteria (including that of the Union’s own absorption 
capacity).  Forms of partnership, not (necessarily) leading to membership, were 
conversely stressed as desirable alternatives – both for the three candidates for full 
membership and for those countries (notably in the Western Balkans) which would be 
excluded a priori from such membership by this policy line.  The formal party position, 
as enunciated in its 2006 electoral manifesto, did not go as far as the (quasi-)final 
demarcation of the geographical limits of the EU advocated by the discussion note, but 
did lay comparable emphasis on the desirability of finding intermediate forms of 
association with the EU, in preference to the continued extension of full membership 
(CDA 2006b). 
 
  Moving beyond the parties in the 2005 ‘Yes’ camp, there is also a noteworthy 
similarity of approaches to questions surrounding European integration across the 
referendum divide.  Most of the parties which had campaigned for a ‘No’ to the 
Constitutional Treaty may, nonetheless, be seen as broadly situating themselves relative 
to much the same ‘limits of Europe’ discourse which has come to permeate the Dutch debate over the course of the past decade.  In doing so, they evidently drew different 
conclusions as to where that boundary should lie in terms of the broad question of the 
constitutional character of the Union – but do not necessarily do so on more specific 
policy questions. 
 
The 2006 election manifesto of the most prominent party in the ‘No’ camp, the 
Socialist Party, is illustrative of this more general pattern.  The party’s discussion of 
European integration continues to be characterised by a studied ‘Eurosceptic’ tone – both 
strongly criticising the ‘neoliberal’ direction taken by the process and brandishing the 
threat of a putative ‘European superstate’.  More substantively, however, the party 
position is one which stresses that ‘European co-operation within the framework of the 
EU should limit itself to the internal market and cross-border questions, such as the fight 
against terrorism, the environment, energy, and asylum policy’ (Socialistische Partij 
2006: 68).  As such, on questions of traditional domestic policy, there is relatively little 
difference between the boundaries which the SP seeks to impose on the European project 
and those advocated by the mainstream parties which it had opposed during the 
referendum campaign – and this all the more so as the SP has, despite its continued 
critique of ‘neoliberalism’, moved towards an explicit acceptance of the foundations of 
the internal market.  It is now principally the party’s marked reticence as regards the 
further development of an EU foreign policy that substantively places it outside of the 
mainstream consensus on the desirable demarcation of national and European areas of 
competence. 
 
The smaller Christian parties which had campaigned on the ‘No’ side during the 
referendum may also be situated within this discursive mould.  This is consistent with a 
longer-term transition since the 1980s, which has seen the Christian Union (CU) and the 
Political Reform Party (SGP) move from a fundamental (and, indeed, fundamentalist) 
opposition to European integration towards a more limited, critical stance (Vollaard 
2005; 2006).  More specifically, in the case of the Christian Union, its 2006 electoral 
manifesto sets out a relatively detailed blueprint of the division of competence between 
the European and national levels, with the core areas of European competence in this 
vision being defined as the internal market, agriculture, environment, and immigration 
and asylum policy (ChristenUnie 2006: 49).  The smaller and more conservative SGP 
does not delve into European questions in comparable depth in its 2006 electoral 
programme, but strikes much the same note as its counterpart – calling for a ‘practical’ 
and ‘problem-solving’ Europe operating within clearly demarcated set of powers (SGP 
2006: 55).  Again, the broad approach to the question thus readily fits within a ‘limits of 
Europe’ logic, with the two parties significantly distinguishing themselves from the 
mainstream consensus only by their opposition on principle to Turkish EU membership 
(a position shared by none of the bigger parties, although it had been a source of 
considerable controversy within the CDA). 
 
It is only – and perhaps ominously – Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PvV) 
which may be seen to hold to a relatively ‘hard’ Eurosceptic line (Groep Wilders/ PvV 
2006).  In contrast to the careful balancing of areas of ‘more’ and ‘less’ ‘Europe’ seen in 
the case of the other parties on both sides of the referendum question, the Wilders group simply advocates a blanket ban on the transfer of any further powers to Brussels, while 
also demanding the renationalisation of substantial (though undefined) swaths of powers 
already delegated (beyond those strictly necessary for economic co-operation). The group 
further calls for the abolition of the European Parliament (echoing a position taken by the 
late Pim Fortuyn), as well as a ‘strong limitation’ of the European Commission.  To this 
may finally be added the abolition of the Schengen visa, the (unilateral) reduction of the 
net Dutch budget contribution, and – perhaps most prominently – opposition to Turkish 
EU membership (‘Turkey in; the Netherlands out’). 
 
The overall picture to emerge from this brief survey of Dutch party positions is 
thus one, as graphically illustrated below, with a clear centre of gravity. [Diagram 1 
about here] Seven of the nine parties currently represented in the Dutch parliament 
which have expressed a clear policy line on European integration have done so in terms 
which may be readily situated within the ‘limits of Europe’ discursive paradigm presently 
suggested.
4  All express broad support for the European integration project, while at the 
same time seeking selectively to define both areas for its further development and core 
areas of national sovereignty on which it must not be allowed to tread.  Moreover, the 
demarcation of these two spheres of competence, insofar as they are clearly spelled out, 
also appears to be a subject of relatively wide consensus – crossing traditional boundaries 
between the left and right, as well as encompassing both governmental and ‘protest’ 
parties.  Only the Democrats’66, maintaining their traditional ‘federalist’ legacy, and 
Geert Wilders, professing a strong Euroscepticism as part of a broader right-wing 
populism, emerge as outliers.  This picture, as suggested by Van Grinsven et al. (2006: 
21), is perhaps one of a typically Dutch process of ‘platpolderen’ – a flattening or 
accommodation of diverse political positions into a broad, if potentially unworkable 
consensus.  It is also, in this context, the evidence of a ‘Europe debate’ whose basic 
contours, at least in its party political dimension, have not significantly shifted since the 
2005 vote. 
 
Public Consultation 
  The ‘reflection period’ in the Netherlands has further seen broader public 
consultations, although the first attempt at establishing such an exercise ended in a 
noteworthy and very public failure.  In the immediate aftermath of the June 2005 vote, all 
parties, with the exception of the VVD, had thrown their support behind the holding of a 
‘Broad Societal Discussion’ (‘Brede maatschappelijke discussie’) or ‘National Europe 
Debate’.  The intention was to provide a structured forum for a national dialogue on 
Europe, under the joint auspices of the government and the parliament.  The initial 
consensus around the project, however, rapidly broke down. Differences arose both 
between the government and the opposition, and as between the principal ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
parties, concerning the structure and balance of the exercise (NRC Handelsblad, 30 
September 2005).  As a consequence, by October 2005, the plug was definitively pulled 
on holding a public consultation of this sort. 
 
                                                 
4 This survey excludes the Animal Rights’ Party (Partij voor de Dieren) which won (two) seats in the 
Dutch parliament for the first time in 2006, in the absence of a specifically articulated party position 
relative to the questions of European institutional/political development presently discussed. After this initial failure, the government opted instead to rely principally on a 
‘virtual’ consultation of public opinion, in the form of a widely advertised internet 
questionnaire.  Under the banner of ‘Nederland in Europa’, the population was invited to 
fill out the on-line survey over the course a five-week period in March and April 2006.  
According to the final published figures, over 128,000 individuals took part in the survey, 
with over 97,000 filling in the full questionnaire.  The internet survey was further 
supplemented by both a national opinion poll and focus groups. 
 
  The overall findings of this exercise (Anker Solutions 2006) generally reflected – 
and found a reflection in – the ‘limits of Europe’ discursive frame already delineated.  
Confirming the consistent findings of Eurobarometer surveys, support for Dutch EU 
membership itself remained at a comparatively high level – with 65% of respondents 
finding it a ‘good thing’, as opposed to only 15% who found it a ‘bad thing’.  The 
assessment of the contribution of EU membership to national welfare was, however, 
perhaps rather less resolute than one might have expected.  Only a plurality of 
respondents (46%) saw the EU as having contributed positively to national welfare, with 
a substantial minority (28%) taking the opposite view.  The discursive anchoring of the 
European integration project as a necessary component in the maintenance of national 
well-being would thus seem to have at least partially slipped its moorings.  The broad 
support for membership is further qualified by a feeling (underscored during the 
referendum campaign) that the integration process is proceeding at too fast a pace - 53% 
of respondents finding this to be the case, in contrast to only 15% who found European 
integration to be moving too slowly. 
   
A relatively predictable portrait emerges as regards the more specific delineation 
of the geographical and substantive limits of the European project.  Considerable 
reticence is displayed towards the continued geographical enlargement of the Union.   
Presented with a list of ten possible future EU members, respondents expressed clear 
(and, indeed, overwhelming) support only in the case of the lone West European country 
in the sample, Norway (at 87%).  Conversely, figures for the other listed countries ranged 
from a 51% opposition in the case of Croatia to a 68% opposition in the case of Turkey.  
The substantive extension of EU competences did, however, enjoy significant backing, in 
terms largely consistent with those seen in the preceding survey of party programmes.  
Notably, strong support emerged for a greater EU role in the fight against terrorism and 
in the area of environmental policy, while respondents also favoured moves towards a 
common EU asylum policy and the further development of police co-operation, including 
(under strict control) the facilitation of cross-border information exchange. 
 
   The results of the survey figured prominently in the cabinet’s published analysis 
of developments during the ‘reflection period’ (Regering 2006), with the government 
principally viewing the exercise as confirmation of its established policy choices.  It was 
in this vein that Foreign Minister Ben Bot, when presenting the survey results, 
highlighted the government’s commitment to push for further European co-operation in 
the areas of justice, energy, employment, and foreign policy (NRC Handelsblad, 20 May 
2006).  More expansively, European Affairs Minister Atzo Nicolaï drew on the survey to 
put forward his own – and by implicit extension the government’s – vision of the future direction of the European project.
5  His analysis took as its starting point the deep-seated 
concerns to which the survey pointed as regards the Netherlands’ place in the EU.  As he 
put it, ‘It is striking how many Dutch people are afraid that their country will be 
swallowed up in a bigger and bigger EU.  To them the EU is like a snowball that has 
gradually turned into an avalanche’ (Nicolaï 2006: 10).  The response demanded was 
consequently one which sought to (re-) legitimate the European project by means of its 
clear delimitation, with the further delegation of powers to the European level permitted 
only where strictly necessary.  To this end, ‘Europe-wide cooperation should be a 
calculated choice, not the standard response to every problem that arises’ (Nicolaï 2006: 
26).  More specifically, touching on a number of issues which had proved particularly 
sensitive in the 2005 referendum, Nicolaï (2006: 26-27) went on to add: 
 
Again and again, the Netherlands must decide whether the EU is the proper forum 
for resolving a given problem.  In some cases we have no desire whatsoever to 
surrender out authority.  We will continue to make our own laws about 
euthanasia, abortion and gay marriage.  Other EU countries may have very 
different views about these issues, but since they have no transnational 
implications, the Netherlands will continue to pursue its own course.  The same 
applies for those aspects of our drugs policy which are purely domestic in nature.  
Education, social policy and health care are also primarily national 
responsibilities and will remain so.  And of course, the EU has no authority to 
deploy Dutch troops to crisis zones; that is and will remain the prerogative of the 
national government. 
 
  Beyond the confirmation of substantive policy choices, the government also saw 
the internet consultation exercise as a promising procedural innovation.  According to the 
cabinet’s analysis, an internet survey of this type allowed for a much higher level of 
citizen involvement than classic opinion polling, insofar as greater possibilities exist for 
two-way communication and ongoing discussion.  In keeping with this analysis, the 
cabinet therefore undertook ‘to build up the internet site www.nederlandineuropa.nl to 
become a central platform where citizens can find information and discussion about 
topics of contemporary interest’ (Regering 2006: 18). 
 
  Yet, one may well question the extent to which an exercise of this type allows for 
the meaningful discussion of issues.  Although potentially touching on broader questions 
to do with ‘e-democracy’ well beyond the scope of the present paper, it might 
nonetheless be specifically highlighted that the survey exercise itself allowed little scope 
for discussion or deliberation.  Participants in the web survey were essentially presented 
with a series of discrete questions asking for their opinion, allowing for little beyond a 
‘tick box’ response to often complex questions.  Little or no contexualisation of the issues 
was provided, nor was the exercise structured so as to provide a genuine forum within 
which to consider how these discrete choices might relate to one another in the overall 
structuring of a European policy. 
                                                 
5 The book – rapidly dubbed ‘the little orange book’ – was published under the imprimateur of the Foreign 
Ministry and given a wide, free distribution.  Over 20,000 copies were produced of the Dutch version, 
together with 2,000 copies of an English translation for foreign distribution.  
This may, in turn, be linked to the more general absence of a meaningful 
deliberative process.  While ‘public opinion’ was in some sense solicited, no 
accompanying effort was made to engage in a structured ‘debate’ – i.e. presenting and 
discussing alternative policy choices and their consequences.  The main political parties 
essentially appeared unwilling to perform their central institutional role as representative 
mediators, while the nature of the process was also such as to sideline other major 
associational actors.  The process, though vaunted by the government, thus appears 
markedly less satisfactory than the more conventional – and institutionalised – model of 
consultation initially envisaged by way of the ‘National Europe Debate’.  There is also, 
on a wider comparative plane, a noteworthy contrast in this regard between the Dutch 
experience and that of the Irish Republic after the first ‘No’ vote rejecting the Nice 
Treaty.  In the Irish case, commentators have highlighted the success of the National 
Forum on Europe, which proceeded by a series of meetings across the country, in more 
actively engaging a broader range of societal actors with the European policy process 
(O’Brennan 2004) – and this, it might be added, in the context of a significantly lower 
overall degree of institutionalisation of the ‘maatschappelijk middenveld’ (intermediary 
organisations rooted in civil society) than in the Dutch case. 
 
The Policy Community 
A further major strand of post-referendum discussion in the Netherlands concerns 
the specialist European and foreign policy communities, presently examined with 
particular reference to the relevant governmental advisory bodies.  Here too, the broad 
contours of pre-referendum Dutch European debate have not been challenged; certainly, 
there has been no serious consideration of any significant shift in the overall direction of 
policy.  Indeed, as forcefully argued by van Keulen (2006), the major specialist 
contributions to date have tended to privilege ‘form’ at the expense of ‘contents’, centring 
on the mechanics of policy-making rather than on the key policy choices facing the 
country.  This focus on the policy-making process may, in part, be explained with 
reference to the specific briefs of many of the agencies concerned.  It remains, however, 
that the overall picture appears strikingly incomplete – ultimately, on its own terms, not 
presenting a compelling strategic vision of either the shaping or the shape of Dutch 
European policy. 
 
  One of the first major reports to be produced after the 2005 vote was that of the 
Council of State, published in September 2005 (Raad van State 2005).  This advisory 
opinion was principally concerned to examine the institutional relationships between the 
domestic political system and the European level, though also with a broader remit to 
consider ways in which citizen involvement with European affairs might be enhanced. 
The Council’s main recommendations stressed the need for European affairs to become 
more fully integrated into the domestic system of policy-making and, by extension, more 
firmly embedded within domestic political debate.  To this end, it advocated a series of 
more specific institutional reforms, including such measures as the systematic application 
of a subsidiarity test to new European legislation by the national parliament (with a 
commensurate increase in institutional resources) and the strengthening of the 
mechanisms for the domestic co-ordination of European policy (with particular emphasis placed on both the collective role of the cabinet and the individual role of the prime 
minister).  As such, the report provides a reasonably comprehensive blueprint for the 
reform of the EU policy-making process in the Netherlands, whose realisation would 
likely increase both the efficiency of decision-making and the accountability of decision-
makers.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how the Council’s proposals, essentially 
restricted to the mechanics of governance, might in themselves further serve to remedy 
the deeper problems of citizen disengagement from an inevitably complex, multi-level 
political process which they also sought to address. 
 
  Much the same assessment may be made of the report of the government’s 
Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), issued in December 2005.  The AIV 
report addresses itself to ‘the gap that has arisen between the general public and the 
national policymakers who concern themselves with European affairs’ (AIV 2005: 8).  
The measures proposed to close this gap extend to both the national and the European 
levels, with the AIV’s domestic recommendations largely echoing those of the Council of 
State.  In particular, emphasis was again placed on the need for a greater degree of 
national parliamentary involvement with European affairs, as well as on the necessity of 
devoting greater institutional resources to support this process.  The AIV was also keen 
that national politicians should begin more squarely to address European issues as part of 
domestic political debates – airing more openly such differences as might exist between 
them on questions of Dutch priorities in Europe, future enlargements of the Union, or 
more specific policy choices.  There is, however, no clear indication in the Advisory 
Council’s analysis of the institutional dynamics which would prompt this ‘true 
politicisation of the EU’ (AIV 2005: 18), beyond something of a volontariste engagement 
on the part of the political class itself. 
 
  Finally, to complete this limited survey of the major official reports in the post-
referendum period, mention should be made of the European aspect of the work of the 
National Convention.  The Convention, established under the auspices of the Ministry of 
the Interior, was a broad consultative exercise on the reform of the Dutch state, 
established with an express mandate to examine the means for a restoration of the 
relationship of trust between citizens and public authorities.  Although much of the 
Convention’s work thus focused on domestic issues, a significant strand in its 
deliberations concerned the relationship of the national and the European political 
systems.  The group’s final recommendations, published in September 2006 (Nationale 
Conventie 2006a: 51-56), partly reflected institutional concerns similar to those seen in 
the earlier reports of the Council of State and the AIV.  The improvement of 
parliamentary scrutiny was again very much to the fore, with the Convention advocating 
the establishment in Dutch practice of both a sifting committee and a scrutiny reserve for 
European legislation on the Westminster model.  On the institutional plane, the final 
report further made the case for the selection of the Dutch member of the European 
College of Commissioners by way of a parliamentary vote, as well as for the abolition of 
the current prohibition in the Netherlands on the simultaneous holding of a national and a 
European parliamentary mandate (on the premise that such a cumul des mandats might 
serve to restore better practical conduits of information between Strasbourg/Brussels and 
The Hague).  
  In contrast to the other two reports, the final report of the Convention, however, 
further sought to strike out beyond such procedural questions, and to engage with a more 
substantive vision of the future direction of Dutch European policy.  Here, it centrally put 
forward the idea of a ‘statenverbond’ as an appropriate starting point and organising 
device for a national discussion on the political ‘finality’ of the Union.
6  ‘Statenverbond’ 
is a direct Dutch translation of the term ‘Statenverbund’, used by the German 
Constitutional Court in its landmark 1993 decision on the Maastricht Treaty to define the 
distinctive political reality of the European political system – placing it in a novel, but 
definable category of political entity between more classic federal and confederal 
political forms.  In the present context, the term was similarly intended to capture the 
reality of a supranational political system which had acquired a significant autonomous 
existence, but which remained dependent upon – and in no way subsumed – its 
constituent member states.  Underlying the somewhat inelegant phraseology is therefore a 
core concept which seeks to allay fears that the progress of European integration is 
eroding national democracy and threatening national identity.  As the argument was 
phrased in the final report of the Convention’s European working group, it was by way of 
introducing a ‘clarity over the core and limitations of European co-operation’, that an 
effective response could be found to the ‘manifest aversion’ which had grown up towards 
the ‘creeping delegation of powers to Europe and the uncontrolled disappearance of 
national control’ (Nationale Conventie 2006b: 35).  Perhaps tellingly, however, attempts 
to engage a wider public or political debate around the concept of the ‘statenverbond’ 
(NRC Handelsblad, 11 May 2006) – or more generally surrounding competing visions of 
the ‘finalité politique’ of the Union – failed to find a significant resonance. 
 
  Consistent with Vivien Schmidt’s (2006b) argument, the Dutch case thus presents 
strong evidence of the prevalence of a ‘co-ordinative’ over a ‘communicative’ discourse 
in the case of a ‘compound polity’.  Indeed, this co-ordinative predominance assumes an 
almost literal quality in the present instance, insofar as the perceived need for a better 
‘communication’ of European issues has essentially resolved itself in terms of a 
discussion of the improvement of co-ordinative mechanisms both within the state and as 
between the state and the citizen.  The frequency and the nature of the use of the term 
‘politicisation’ (politisering) in the Dutch debate is particularly revealing in this regard.  
Both governmental documents and academic commentators have argued strongly for a 
greater ‘politicisation’ of European issues at the domestic level (see van Grinsven et al. 
2005 for an overview; see also de Volkskrant, 1 June 2006), but have done so essentially 
in procedural rather than substantive terms – i.e. somewhat paradoxically as a goal in 
itself to be pursued by political actors, rather than as the consequence of mobilisations 
around competing policy choices. 
 
                                                 
6 The final report, in this vein, also clearly reflected the concerns of its European rapporteur, Alfred 
Pijpers, who had written generally of the need to break the apparent ‘finaliteitstaboe’ (‘finality taboo’) in 
Dutch European debate. This was intended to foster a more open and explicit political dialogue surrounding 
the major, competing visions of the European integration project, and the implications of these differing 
future directions for the Dutch position within the EU  See Pijpers 2006.    This absence of more substantive discussion extends to the rather surprising 
recent dearth of traditional foreign policy debates concerned with national place and 
strategy.  Clearly, the ‘No’ in the 2005 referendum and the more general shift in the tenor 
of Dutch European policy over the past decade raises important questions as to the 
country’s place in the enlarged European Union.  Most prominently, a national discourse 
principally preoccupied with ‘limiting’ the integration project no longer neatly 
corresponds with the country’s traditional self-image as a central player in that process.  
Such developments should not be over dramatised, but there is nonetheless a clear need 
to engage in a critical discussion of the manner in which specific policy choices relate to 
wider coalitional possibilities and dynamics within the Union, not least in terms of the 
relationships with traditional partners such as Germany and the other Benelux countries.  
Yet, there is little evidence of such discussions seriously being undertaken.  While there 
is a pronounced skittishness in The Hague at any suggestion that the Netherlands may no 
longer have an unquestioned place in any ‘core group’ of EU member states,
7 this has not 
been accompanied by any sustained effort to tackle the question of how such changing 
external perceptions may relate to the more specific policy positions which the country 
has assumed. 
 
The Balkenende IV Government 
  The political centre of gravity described in the preceding sections finally finds 
faithful expression in the European policy of the three-party coalition government formed 
in February 2007 (bringing together the new combination of Christian Democrats, the 
Labour Party, and the Christian Union, under the continuing leadership of Prime Minister 
Jan Peter Balkenende).   To judge by the media reports, European questions played only a 
relatively minor role in the protracted coalition negotiations, with the most contentious 
issue being that of the holding of a further referendum on any subsequent EU Treaty 
reform.  Here, faced with the need to paper over the divide between the CDA’s long 
established opposition to referenda and Labour’s manifesto commitment to a second vote, 
the Coalition Agreement awkwardly circumvented the issue, making no mention of a 
referendum per se and suggesting only that the opinion of the Council of State would be 
sought.
8
                                                 
7 This sensitivity was perhaps most tellingly revealed by the strong and quick reaction in Dutch official 
circles to newly elected Italian Premier Romano Prodi’s reported remarks in a 16 April 2006 interview with 
the British Sunday Times, to the effect that: ‘We need a strong relationship not just with France and 
Germany, but also with the so-called group of six, countries like Belgium and Luxembourg – but not the 
Netherlands’.  Prodi, in a subsequent and hastily arranged interview with the NRC Handelsblad (19 April 
2006), affirmed that he had been mistranslated, and had actually stressed the Netherlands’ place in a 
European ‘core group’.  Nevertheless, whether misinterpreted or not, the initial report of his remarks had 
clearly struck a nerve.  A similar reaction was also elicited by the meeting of the so-called ‘group of 18’ in 
January 2007, when the Spanish government brought together the eighteen countries which had ratified the 
Constitutional Treaty, to the pointed exclusion of both the Netherlands and France (NRC Handelsblad, 27 
January 2007). 
8 It is unclear, however, on what basis the Council of State would deliver such a opinion.  There is no 
obligation under Dutch constitutional law to hold a referendum, nor conversely is there a constitutional 
impediment to an advisory referendum if parliament should so decide and provide the appropriate 
legislative framework.  This leaves only the political question of the desirability of holding such a vote – 
the decision which the coalition partners ducked, and which the high administrative court is unlikely to take 
in their stead.  It might, however, be noted that the Council had delivered a markedly supportive opinion in  
More substantively, the parties had little apparent difficulty in coming to an 
agreement on a policy line including both the rejection of any attempt to resuscitate the 
Constitutional Treaty in its present form and a future development of the Union 
consistent with the ‘limits of Europe’ discourse defined above.  Again, subsidiarity 
figures prominently, as the Coalition Agreement sets out in broad terms that: ‘The 
Netherlands commits itself to effective co-operation in the European context with a 
clearer division of tasks between the member states and the Union on the basis of the 
subsidiarity principle’ (Coalitieakkoord 2007: 13).  Specifically, the catalogue of areas 
seen as both ripe for further co-operation and as off limits for any European incursions 
reflects those consistently cited across the main party manifestos.  Competition policy, 
transborder environmental problems, energy policy, asylum and migration policy, foreign 
policy and anti-terrorism measures all figure in the ‘more Europe’ column, while such 
sensitive areas as pensions, social insurance, taxation, education, and health care are 
explicitly identified as ‘no go’ areas for European co-operation.  On the geographical 
‘limits’ of the EU, the Coalition Agreement further demands a strict(er) application of the 
Copenhagen criteria as regards any future enlargement, with an implied criticism of 
recent practice in its insistence that an accession date henceforth be announced only after 
a candidate state has fulfilled all criteria. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  Overall, the terms of post-referendum debate on European integration in the 
Netherlands have not departed significantly from the previously predominant discursive 
framework.  Party-based debate has continued largely to be situated within what has 
presently been termed a ‘limits of Europe’ discourse – concerned to delineate both the 
substantive and the geographical limits of the European integration project and, in so 
doing, to provide a renewed legitimation for that project.  The details of where those 
precise ‘limits’ might lie has to some extent been filled in, but the broad contours of the 
debate have not shifted.  Indeed, if anything, the period since the June 2005 referendum 
has seen a further convergence of party positions, with virtually all major players in the 
Dutch political system subscribing to much the same checklist of areas where both 
‘more’ and ‘less’ ‘Europe’ is deemed desirable.  Beyond the party political arena, the 
major public consultation exercise undertaken during this period provided further support 
for a ‘limits of Europe’ approach, albeit, as highlighted earlier, with a notable reservation 
as regards the deliberative quality of the process itself.  This broad policy frame also has 
not been challenged by the specialist European and foreign policy communities, who 
have largely focused their attention on the reform of the mechanics of domestic EU 
policy-making, to the relative exclusion of strategic visions of the desirable overall 
direction of Dutch European policy.  The policy line of the current Dutch government, as 
it heads into the next round of European treaty negotiations, may similarly be situated 
squarely within this discursive frame. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
connection with the choice made to hold an advisory referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (Opinion 
No.W04.03.0194/I, 14 July 2003). 
 These national developments do, of course, correspond to wider patterns.  The 
Dutch proclivity for a ‘pick and choose’ model of future European co-operation parallels 
moves elsewhere to define a ‘Europe des projets’ or, expressed less elegantly, to 
concentrate attention on an ‘output legitimacy’.  Yet, though part of a wider shift, the 
strong and recurring emphasis in Dutch political discourse on the principle of subsidiarity 
nonetheless bears underlining.  It is clear that the prevalence of this discursive referent in 
recent debates has much deeper roots in the national political culture – reflecting 
underlying fears that the continued progress of European integration threatens not only 
the autonomy of the national state (vertical subsidiarity), but also (and perhaps more 
centrally) the autonomy which that state has historically accorded to groups and 
individuals to organise their own affairs (horizontal subsidiarity).  It is unclear, however, 
that the invocation and delineation of the principle of subsidiarity itself will serve 
effectively to quell such deep-seated doubts as may have emerged.  In effect, a principle 
of the division of powers seems unlikely, over the longer term, to assume the place of a 
compelling, wider discourse of legitimation – returning us to the spectre of Koole’s 
‘monster’, whereby an entity defined principally in relation to its limits cannot help but 
provoke ongoing anxieties. 
 
Equally, the underlying preoccupation with a sense of disconnection between the 
elite and wider public opinion over European issues seen in the present case corresponds 
to a wider perception of a ‘crisis of representation’.  Yet, here again, the specific national 
variation on the wider theme merits examination.  Dutch commentators have tended to 
highlight the particular severity of the disconnection between the political class (‘de 
regenten’) and national society, seeing the current malaise as reflecting a rejection of 
‘The Hague’ as much as, if not more than ‘Brussels’ (Binnema and Crum 2007 
forthcoming; Koch 2005).  This pronounced sense of disconnection derives from a deeper 
structural dynamic, in which, consistent with Vivien Schmidt’s (2006b) analysis of 
‘compound polities’, Dutch elites have found it particularly – and, on occasion, painfully 
– difficult to engage in the forms of strong ‘communicative discourse’ required to explain 
and ultimately to legitimate the adaptations demanded of the domestic system.  Indeed, 
one may speak of a ‘compounding’ of problems in the Dutch case, insofar as both a 
national ‘accommodationist’ model of politics (the ‘platpolderen’ discussed above) and 
the relatively ‘depoliticised’ character of EU governance both appear to obviate the 
presentation of clear, alternative political choices.  It is not difficult, in this light, to see 
the medium to longer term possibility of an embedded ‘mass-elite’ division on the Danish 
pattern (Flockhart 2005; Sørensen 2004) taking root in the Netherlands.  Most obviously, 
the mishandling of a second referendum – with respect either to the terms on which it is 
not held or to the conduct of the campaign if one does take place – could significantly 
move Dutch debates in this direction, albeit with a necessarily different construction of 
‘the people’ than that distinctively shaped by the Danish politico-cultural tradition 
(Hansen 2002). 
 
The overall picture which emerges in the Dutch case is consequently one in which 
the political class has, in the post-referendum period as before it, failed to find an entirely 
convincing national narrative of European integration.  The ‘story’ which the country 
wishes to tell both itself and others as to its sense of place and purpose in the enlarged European Union remains, at best, unclear.  Nevertheless, here too, the Netherlands is 
evidently not alone in facing such problems, and it is as well to contextualise its 
experience relative to that of comparator countries. 
 
Most prominently, it should perhaps be stressed that, despite the critical turn in 
national European debate, the Netherlands is ‘not Britain’.  The levels of public 
scepticism and press hostility to the European project seen in the British case do not find 
an echo in the Netherlands.  Similarly, though there are strong Atlanticist and 
internationalist referents in Dutch political culture, these have not, in sharp contrast to the 
British case, been constructed in terms of providing a global (in both senses of the word) 
alternative to participation in the European integration project.  The discourse of ‘limits’ 
highlighted in the present paper, if lacking a strong positive vision of the European 
integration project, is nonetheless, by definition, firmly situated within that project, in 
opposition to a British debate still often marked by a more fundamental questioning of 
the project itself (cf. Schmidt 2006a; Harmsen 2007 forthcoming). 
 
Rather, the most obvious parallels to the evolution of the Dutch debate are, 
unsurprisingly, to be found in the case of other founding member states.  There are 
evident similarities with the case of Germany, where commentators have likewise spoken 
of the rise of a limited Euroscepticism and the (re)discovery of an explicit discourse of 
national interest (Busch and Knelangen 2004; Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).  The discursive 
shift in the German case does, nonetheless, appear somewhat less pronounced.  Notably, 
unlike the Netherlands, a ‘constitutional federalist’ position continues to enjoy 
considerable mainstream support, as evidenced in both Joshka Fischer’s 2000 Humboldt 
University speech and the broad policy line of the current Merkel government. 
 
The evolution of French debates concerning the European Union also offers 
interesting parallels to developments in the Netherlands, with both countries appearing to 
suffer from comparable senses of ‘dislocation’ within the enlarged Union.  Both France 
and the Netherlands readily appear as ‘pays délocalisés’ –  countries which have not (as 
yet) been able to frame a convincing discourse as to their place within a much enlarged 
Union, where they no longer may see themselves as a central player or as part of the 
‘chosen few’.  There is, in this vein, a striking symmetry between the Dutch discourse of 
‘limits’ and a French European discourse focused equally pervasively on the question of 
‘influence’ (Dulphy and Manigand 2006; Drake 2005).  Comparably strong leitmotifs 
emerge in the two cases, as the larger country seeks to regain lost influence and to project 
its policy choices on to the wider stage, while the smaller country seeks to delimit a 
project where it accepts, a priori, that its influence will be modest. 
 
The challenges facing Dutch European policy are thus ultimately those facing 
member states more generally.  The Dutch government, like its counterparts elsewhere, 
must learn to navigate in a situation where the ‘permissive consensus’ for European 
integration has definitively eroded, without however having given rise to more 
conventionally defined lines of political cleavage or to other forms of significant 
mobilisation around European issues.  The dual focus, in the post-referendum period, on 
the potentially competing demands of ‘Nederland in Europa’ and ‘Europa in Nederland’ is suggestive of at least an awareness of the novel context within which European policy 
must now be made.  Having started to pose the appropriate questions, it remains, 
however, very much to be seen if the Dutch political class will prove to be more 
successful in finding compelling ‘answers’. Certainly, heading into a new round of 
(limited) Treaty negotiations, a clearer image continues to appear of the Europe which the 
Netherlands does not want, than of a more positive agenda. 
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